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Abstract 
The paper‟s aim is twofold: it first introduces a revisited Legitimacy Theory (LT) 
framework and then moves on to empirically consider its applicability by examining the 
reaction of international aviation companies, in terms of Annual and Sustainability 
Reports disclosure, to some major social accidents. The accidents reviewed are the 
Concorde crash north of Paris (2000) and its effect on the reporting of British Airways 
(BA), and the Singapore Airlines (SIA) accident at T‟ai-pei. A largely qualitative 
approach to Content Analysis (CA) is employed, considering not only the variations in the 
measured levels of CSD prior and following the accident, but also what is actually stated 
in the disclosures. The quantitative and qualitative evidence from both the companies 
support the identified as pragmatic, image-oriented variant of the framework, where 
organisations engage with CSR to ensure they possess adequate supplies of the legitimacy 
resource to maintain profitability and long term survival. 
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In Search of Explanations for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR):  
An Attempt to Revisit and Assess Legitimacy Theory 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The behaviour of corporations has never been more under the spotlight (McIntosh et al, 
2003). Although this was not considered to be a new issue even in the 1960s (Drucker, 
1969), or 1950s (Heald, 1957), public awareness of the environmental, social and 
economic impacts of business has increased at a dramatic rate over the last decades. 
Companies now face increased pressure from investors, governments, customers and 
others to demonstrate their efforts to manage the impacts of their operations (Scott and 
Jackson, 2002). Accounting, as “a set of socially conditioned practices which have various 
significant impacts on the operation of our society” (Bebbington, 2004, p16), is called 
upon to assist in demonstrating the accountability and integrity of business actions.  
 
As a result of the combinations of the increased pressures companies face, Corporate 
Social Reporting
1
 (CSR) has been developed to address the increased need for information 
that the company‟s stakeholders have regarding its social and environmental performance. 
Compared to the long historical practice of financial reporting, however, the development 
of social and environmental reporting practices is still in its infancy and there is much 
debate on various issues (see, Gray et al, 1995a; Mathews, 1997; Gray, 2001; Deegan, 
2002; Lehman, 2004; Owen, 2008). Among these, a prominent question is what motivates 
managers to take CSR action, given that generally they are not required by law to do so 
(but see Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Gray et al, 1995b; Deegan, 2000, 2004; KPMG, 2005, 
and Appendix D, for some reported exceptions). Indeed, it has been argued that a major 
setback for the CSR literature to overcome in order to possess coherence is the lack of any 
agreed theoretical perspective to drive systematic research (Trotman and Bradley, 1981; 
Ullmann, 1985; Gray et al, 1995a; O‟Dwyer, 1999; Tilt, 2003).  
 
                                                 
1
 Gray et al (1987) define Corporate Social Reporting as „the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of organisations‟ economic actions to particular interest groups within society and to 
society at large. As such, it involves extending the accountability of organisations (particularly companies), 
beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to the owners of capital, in particular, 
shareholders. Such an extension is predicated upon the assumption that companies do have wider 
responsibilities than simply to make money for their shareholders‟ (p. ix).  
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Despite that in the past twenty and more years, calls for normative and empirical papers 
contributing to CSR theorisation are increasing (see Ullmann, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 
1989; Zéghal and Ahmed, 1990; Gray et al, 1997; Mathews, 1997; Deegan, 2002; Tilt, 
2003; Parker, 2005), most frequently single theoretical explanations are offered that 
accept some explanations and reject others, thereby “ignoring the potential variety of 
explanations for CSR practice (or non-practice) in particular contexts” (O‟Dwyer, 1999, 
p202): only a few research efforts comprehensively review three or more theoretical 
explanations (Mathews, 1993; Gray et al, 1995a; Gray et al, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Zain, 
1999; Campbell, 2000; Woodward et al, 2001; Deegan and Unerman, 2006; Owen, 2008), 
or provide frameworks modelling the relationships of the theories (Gray et al, 1996; 
Laughlin, 1990; Woodward et al, 2001; Roberts and Chen, 2006), regardless of the fact 
that it is widely acknowledged that these perspectives overlap considerably (Gray et al, 
1995a; Zain, 1999; O‟Dwyer, 1999; Deegan, 2000). As Gray et al pointed out as early as 
in 1997, these issues need to be addressed “if social accounting now is to develop in any 
systematic way and neither fizzle out through lack of direction nor be captured and 
trivialised by powerful organisations” (p326). 
 
Thus, in response to the existence of this apparent vacuum (O‟Dwyer, 1999), the aim of 
this paper, based on the author‟s doctoral research, is to investigate motivations for CSR 
and contribute to the CSR literature in two ways: first, by introducing a framework to 
model the relationships and synthesise most of the oft-suggested theoretical explanations 
for CSR; and second, by attempting to empirically consider its applicability by examining 
the reaction of international aviation companies, in terms of Annual and Sustainability 
Reports disclosure, to some major social accidents. To support these objectives, it is more 
specifically attempted to answer whether CSR is a strategic or ethics oriented activity; 
whether CSR is a more internally/proactive or an externally/reactive driven activity; and 
whether CSR generally results from organisational attempts to comply with the terms of a 
contractual relationship between them and their external and internal constituents, or 
whether other explanations are more applicable. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the theoretical framework of the study is reviewed, 
followed by a discussion on disasters and how these could be related to the framework 
and have been employed in the CSR literature. The subsequent sections briefly introduce 
the methods and propositions of the study and present in more detail the findings for each 
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case. The final section of this paper discusses the results and makes some concluding 
comments. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Explaining CSR 
 
Attempts to explain why companies are making social disclosures abound (Zain, 1999) 
and this may be partly attributed to the ongoing debate behind Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSRes) and the identified lack of regulation (see Gray et al, 1995a; Gray 
et al, 1996; Adams et al, 1998; O‟Dwyer, 1999; Deegan, 2000; Clikeman, 2004; Deegan, 
2004; Turner et al, 2006). An overarching question in the CSR literature is whether CSR 
is reactive or proactive, whether it is the organisation‟s or the society‟s interests that 
prevail (see, Lindblom, 1994; Zain, 1999; O‟Dwyer, 1999; Woodward and Woodward, 
2001; Woodward et al, 2001; O‟Donovan, 2002). 
 
From a reactive point of view it has been suggested that increased Corporate Social 
Disclosures (CSD) may be expected to occur when an organisation‟s legitimacy is 
threatened (Deegan and Ranking, 1996; Deegan et al, 2002; Tilling, 2004), when 
organisations face increased media exposure (Media Agenda-Setting Theory – MAST, 
Deegan et al, 2000; 2002; Patten, 2002a) or increased general public pressure (Boulding, 
1978; Patten, 2002b) and generally do not comply with the requirements of an implicit 
social contract (Shocker and Sethi, 1973, 1974; Gray et al, 1988;  Garcia-Lacalle, 2006); 
when organisations imitate each other and adopt institutionalised practices (institutional 
theory, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Bansal and Roth, 2000; Woodward et al, 2004); or 
when they face threats to their image (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al, 2000; 
Adams, 2002). The above arguments would generally comply with a view of 
accountability “conceived of as a relational issue”, where organisations are “being 
answerable to and held responsible by others” (Unerman and O‟Dwyer, 2006, p353), 
regardless of how selectively the recipients of the account/stakeholders are identified by 
their accountable organisations. It should be noted, however, that even when organisations 
adopt such an externally motivated accountability view, they may still be possibly CSR 
proactive in case, for example, they are anticipating such future stakeholder needs.  
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In contrast, there are some other perspectives considering organisations now to be too 
powerful and able to dictate the agenda, including three distinct approaches to Political 
Economy of Accounting (PE) theory, most of which emphasise that CSR may be 
employed by some powerful organisations to control their environments.
2
 From this 
proactive standpoint, CSR may also occur when managers attempt to minimise reported 
earnings and reduce the likelihood of adverse political actions (Positive Accounting 
theory (PA), Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Belkaoui and Karpik, 1989; Milne, 2001); 
when companies attempt to improve their image to mystify consumers‟ perceptions of the 
firm by simply advertising their legitimacy (Gray and Roberts, 1989; Poiesz, 1989; 
Adams et al, 1998; Woodward et al, 2001); and when companies want to raise their share 
performance (Decision Making Theory, Abbot and Monsen, 1979; Anderson and Frankle, 
1980; Freedman and Patten, 2004). Even organisations with ethical orientations, however, 
which would feel that people have an inalienable right to information that should be 
satisfied by providing an account (Tricker, 1983; Laughlin, 1990; Gray et al, 1988; 1991; 
1995a; Zain, 1999; Jones, 2006), would be internally motivated and adopt a generally 
proactive CSR stance. Yet again, as Unerman and O‟Dwyer (2006) note, even in the case 
of such an adopted „identity‟ form of accountability, where internally motivated 
organisations “feel a responsibility… to be accountable… to themselves… in the form of 
their values, mission and culture” (p356), these may still feel the responsibility to be 
accountable to stakeholders affected by their actions, and thus appear to be responsive/ 
reactive in their CSR approach. 
 
When one attempts to adopt this action–centred reactive vs proactive theoretical CSR 
perspectives distinction, therefore, it becomes evident that the offered explanations under 
each category are quite diverse: proactive explanations may incorporate arguments for 
powerful organisations employing CSR to manipulate stakeholders but also arguments for 
organisations truly embracing the accountability notion; likewise, reactive CSD may be a 
                                                 
2
 These approaches to PE include the one where PE is viewed to be the social, political and economic 
framework within which human life (including CSR and other frameworks, such as legitimacy theory) takes 
place (PE1, Gray et al, 1995, 1996; Campbell, 2000; Gray, 2001); the one where PE suggests that managers 
are strong enough (and may also employ CSR) to mediate, mystify, and shape the world (PE2, Benson, 
1982; Neimark and Tinker, 1986; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 1990; Woodward et al. 2001); and the one 
suggested by Buhr (1998), which considers PE to be the hegemonic perspective assuming that a power élite 
exists that controls resources and may employ CSR to maintain control, but where, contrary to the PE1 
assumption, it is PE which is a means to organisational legitimation, and may be considered as part of a 
wider legitimacy theory framework (PE3), see also support from O‟Donovan, 2002 and even similarities in 
Guthrie and Parker‟s, 1990, definition of PE). 
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sign of a responsive corporate stance to the expectations of its constituents but also of an 
organisation interested in image building and in ultimate survival (see Adams et al, 1998; 
Woodward et al, 2001; Deegan et al, 2002). As it is argued below, these arguments may 
be perhaps more suitably classified when incorporated into a revisited legitimacy theory 
framework.  
 
2.2 Legitimacy theory 
 
The theoretical framework adopted in this study is Legitimacy Theory (LT), probably the 
most frequently adopted framework in the CSR literature (see Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and 
Parker, 1989, 1990; Patten, 1992; Pava and Krausz, 1997; Adams and Heart, 1998; Brown 
and Deegan, 1998; Neu et al, 1998; O‟Donovan, 1999; O‟Dwyer, 1999; 2002; 2003; 
Campbell, 2000; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Woodward et al, 2001; Deegan, 2002; 
Deegan et al, 2002; Patten, 2002a,b; Campbell et al, 2003; Crowther, 2004; Tilling, 2004; 
Roberts and Chen, 2006). LT posits that a social contract or agreement exists between an 
enterprise and its constituents, due to which “business agrees to perform various socially 
desired actions in return for approval of its objectives, other rewards and ultimate 
survival” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 344).3.   
 
Under this perspective, organisations would employ a number of legitimation strategies, 
to extend, maintain or defend their legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 
1995; Tilling, 2004) and control for potential existing or perceived legitimacy gaps 
following legitimacy threats (Lindblom, 1994; Deegan, 2000; Savage et al, 2000). Despite 
its wide employment, however, limited research has been conducted on how LT may 
incorporate other theoretical arguments towards explaining CSR action (but see Suchman, 
1995; Buhr, 1998; Deegan, 2000, 2002; Roberts and Chen, 2006). As Deegan (2002, 
p.298) admits, “legitimacy theory… can still be considered to be… under-developed… 
There are many „gaps‟ in the literature which embraces legitimacy theory” (see also 
expressed concerns by Hybels, 1995; Suchman, 1995; Mobus, 2005 and Owen, 2008). 
 
Despite Zain‟s (1999) arguments that “there is no single theory that is all embracing” 
(p109), it is argued here that the revisited LT framework can incorporate most of the oft-
                                                 
3
 It should be noted that it is the organisational LT variant which informs this discussion, as opposed to the 
legitimacy of the system (Weber, 1966; Habermas, 1973; Gray et al, 1996), political institutions (as 
discussed by Lindblom, 1994) or individuals (discerned by Luthans, 1985; Woodward et al, 1996). 
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cited in the literature theoretical explanations for CSR. First, however, there is a need to 
clarify that legitimacy is perceived here as an operational resource on which 
organisations are dependent for survival and which they extract, often competitively, from 
their cultural environments and employ in pursuit of their goals; this view is most notably 
associated with the work of Pfeffer and his colleagues (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975, Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981, see also Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). Based on this 
condition, as the discussion below illustrates, one may identify four distinct organisational 
variants on how LT and CSR are perceived. 
 
2.3 Legitimacy theory variants 
 
Considering that, as discussed above, legitimacy is a resource on which an organisation is 
dependent for survival, then all surviving organisations should, to a greater or lesser 
extent, posses it, including the ones which do not engage with CSR
4
. These organisations 
“are likely to be strongly profit oriented, perhaps to the exclusion of all other 
considerations… [they] would meet the minimum legal and ethical requirements only… 
[and would] conform to the letter of the law, but no more” (Henderson, 1984, p168). In 
this “pristine capitalist” view (Gray et al, 1996), which has been termed also 
“fundamentalist” (Lindblom, 1994) and “classical” (Boatright, 2003), “the corporation 
exists to earn a profit for the owners and, in doing so, makes the appropriate contribution 
to society” (Lindblom, 1994, p9, see also Friedman, 1962, 1970; Minow, 1996). Thus, 
accountability is owed only to shareholders and “to be economically viable is to be 
legitimate, at least so far as the owners of the business are concerned” (Woodward et al, 
1996, p332). With regards to their constituents‟ potential CSR concerns, these 
organisations would only seek what Suchman (1995) terms, “passive acquiescence”5 from 
their stakeholders for their insignificant CSR employment.  
 
                                                 
4
As the KPMG (2005) International Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting (ISCRR) has revealed, 
36% of the largest 250 members of the Global Fortune 500 (G250) Index and 59% of the top 100 (N100) 
companies in the 16 surveyed countries (including UK, USA, Japan, Germany, France and Australia) do not 
publish separate CSR reports nor include any CSR information in their Annual Reports. See also Verschoor 
(2005) and Campbell and Slack (2006a,b) for supporting evidence. 
5
 As Suchman (1995, p575) notes, “A[n] … underacknowledged distinction in studies of legitimacy centers 
on whether the organization seeks active support or merely passive acquiescence. If an organization simply 
wants a particular audience to leave it alone, the threshold of legitimation may be quite low. Usually, the 
organization need only comport with some unproblematic category of social activity (e.g, „doing business‟). 
If in contrast, an organization seeks protracted audience intervention (particularly against other entities with 
competing cadres), the legitimacy demands may be stringent indeed” (see also similar arguments by 
Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).  
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One may further acknowledge, though, an LT variant where organisations are strongly 
ethics-oriented and presume operating in a socially and environmentally responsible way 
as a prerequisite for securing sufficient quantities of the legitimacy resource and insuring 
their long-term preservation (Gladwin et al, 1995). Such organisations would be internally 
motivated (value driven) but not only to themselves, as the adoption of „identity 
accountability‟ approach would entail, but to all affected constituents of their operations 
(Unerman and O‟Dwyer‟s (2006) identified as first “rational accountability” variant). 
They would further feel that they should provide their constituents with an account of 
their social and environmental activities, regardless of whether this account is actually 
expected or not and irrespective of the power which every constituent holds in relation to 
others (Unerman and O‟Dwyer, 2006). In this approach one would put the supporters of 
what Hemphill (1997) names stakeholder capitalism, which takes a firm ethical stand, 
requiring from humans “to be at the center of any process of value creation” (Freeman, 
2002, p115; for other works on business ethics perspectives see, for example Carroll, 
1979, 1983; 1991; 1999; Henderson, 1984; Evans, 1991; Bovet, 1994; Frederick, 1994; 
Libert, 1996; Hemphill, 1997; 1999; 2004; Boatright, 2003). Such organisations would be 
internally motivated towards CSR (as opposed to external motivation for example from 
stakeholder pressures) but would also be responsive to their constituents needs and in an 
attempt to „do the right thing‟ and discharge their wider accountabilities, they would be 
expected to provide increased CSR information year after year, and thus to attempt to 
extend their legitimacy and ask for „active support‟ (Suchman, 1995) from their 
constituents, in order to increase pressures on other organisations and raise the overall 
benefit and stability of the community they are part of (Bovet, 1994; Libert, 1996; Matten 
and Crane, 2005; Moon et al, 2005).  
 
Still, as the above discussion below subheading 2.1 has illustrated, organisations may 
employ CSR for a number of other than moral reasons
6
. These organisations would not be 
interested in being legitimate (in ethical terms) rather than to be seen as legitimate and 
similarly to the pristine capitalist approaches, would have a profit-orientation. Two broad 
LT types of organisational approaches with regards to strategic (non-ethical) employment 
of CSR may then be identified. 
                                                 
6
 As O‟Dwyer (1999) elaborates on this, “Just because a company appears to be responsive (through CSR) 
does not necessarily imply that it is responsible, as the action dimension of responsiveness… is effectively 
separated from the ethical dimension of responsibility” (p145). 
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In the first type of approaches, the one that may be referred to as „ethics pragmatism‟, 
organisations would acknowledge the importance of providing an account to their 
identified powerful stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Gray et al, 1996; Deegan, 2000) as a 
condition for maintaining legitimacy for their operations and “avoid[ing] potentially 
damaging economic impacts on business” (O‟Dwyer, 1999, p328). These organisations 
would be expected to be “very concerned with image building” (Woodward et al, 2001, 
p387, see also Gray and Roberts, 1989; Creyer and Ross, 1997; Sen and Bhattacharya, 
2001), but only to the degree of ensuring that they possess adequate supplies of the 
legitimacy resource to maintain profitability and long term survival (Bansal and Roth, 
2000; Aguilera et al, 2004; Bansal, 2005). They would project to their constituents that 
they are interested in “profits AND social responsibility” (Henderson, 1984, p170)7; and, 
would be driven by the external pressures of their constituents and would seek a passive 
acquiescence from the latter with regards to their CSR policies. Hence, this approach may 
incorporate the „conventional‟ LT perceptions as well as the MAST, public pressure, 
image and even some institutional arguments described above
8
. 
 
Image–oriented organisations, however, having firstly secured sufficient legitimacy to 
maintain operating, by considering that they can strategically impact and/or manipulate 
(Woodward et al, 2001; Deegan, 2002) their legitimacy, may further attempt to extend it 
and improve their market and economic position (Hart, 1995; Bansal and Roth, 2000; 
Aguilera et al, 2004; Dillard et al, 2005; Vogel, 2005; Mirvis and Googins, 2006), by 
employing CSR to, for example, improve reputation, gain additional market share, and/or 
increase market size and achieve higher levels of customer loyalty (Porter and Van Der 
Linde, 1995;  Adams, 2002; Kusku and Zarkada – Fraser, 2004; Dillard et al, 2005). 
These organisations would embrace Drucker‟s (1984) „opportunistic‟ views towards 
CSRes and “would attempt to turn a social problem into economic opportunity” (p62); 
would be thus internally driven towards CSRes and CSR; and would attempt to attract the 
attention and seek active support from their constituents, with regards to their legitimacy 
and CSR, to achieve their objectives. Evidently, this approach may incorporate also the 
                                                 
7
 But, note that this would be more of a projected rather than actual interest. In practice, all corporate 
entities, including the stakeholder capitalists, should be interested in seeking at least enough profit to 
maintain their survival and satisfy their owners; however, only in the case of the latter, there is an actual 
interest for CSR. Arguably, purely ethics oriented organisations are, for example, charities.  
8
 Public pressure and image arguments are directly related to these arguments, MAST as a factor shaping 
stakeholders‟ expectations (Brown and Deegan, 1998) or even as a stakeholder itself, and institutional 
arguments, in the sense that organisations would perceive CSR as a pragmatic necessity to conform to 
institutionalised pressures and maintain legitimacy. 
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decision making theory, Positive Accounting theory and even Buhr‟s (1998) Political 
Economy theory (PE3) arguments described above
9
. 
 
The above arguments are graphically represented in Figure 1 below. Overall, and similar 
to Henderson‟s (1984) business ethics conceptualisations, three spectrums may be 
identified, with regards to organisational legitimacy and CSR. In the „profit‟ circle, area 
A, those identified as „pristine capitalists‟ would be included, that may ensure legitimacy 
for their operations without having to engage with CSR; whereas, in the other side of the 
spectrum, the „ethics‟ circle, area C, those identified as „stakeholder capitalists‟ would be 
included, that would employ CSR to satisfy the informational needs of all their identified 
stakeholders, a considered prerequisite for them for maintaining legitimacy. The profit in 
disguise area in the middle could be called the „image‟ circle, where both those identified 
as „ethics pragmatists‟ and „ethics opportunists‟ would operate, that would employ CSR 
primarily to be seen as legitimate.  
 
Figure 2.3.1 The Legitimacy Circles 
 
 
However, the existence of some organisations operating under some areas in the borders 
should be acknowledged also, and shown under two of these circles, depicted as areas X 
and Y; in these areas, organisations may be either strongly profit oriented and, for 
                                                 
9
 From a PE perspective, CSD may “serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic 
and political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to the corporation‟s private 
interests” (Guthrie and Parker, 1990, p166); similarly from a decision making perspective CSD would be an 
opportunistic attempt to enhance corporate image or reputation (Gray et al, 1988) and ultimately 
profitability; and from a PA perspective, CSD may also be seen as an opportunistic attempt of an 
organisation “to minimize reported earnings… [to] reduce the likelihood of adverse political actions and, 
thereby, reduce its expected costs” (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p115). 
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example, may be employing some CSR with the sole purpose to further extend this 
profitability through increased legitimacy (area X) or where organisations are primarily 
ethics oriented but they may are also concerned, for example, to advertise their ethicality 
to potentially extend their profitability and secure some more means to actively promote 
their ethical ventures and, therefore, become more legitimate (area Y). It should be further 
acknowledged that organisations may adopt a fluid position and may move between or 
occupy more than one position an any time (McIntosh et al, 2003). 
 
3. Disasters and their Impacts  
 
For the purposes of this research, corporate disclosure reactions to some major legitimacy 
threats in the form of social and environmental accidents are investigated. As Lindblom 
(1994) notes, “To the extent corporate performance does not reflect the expectations of the 
relevant publics a legitimacy gap exists” and “the resulting penalty for any perceived 
legitimacy gap will come in the form available and deemed appropriate by the particular 
person or persons” (p3). Organisations then are expected “in the interests of ongoing 
operations [to] undertake corrective action” (Deegan et al, 2000, p105) and employ CSR 
as part of a strategy to defend their legitimacy (Perrow, 1970; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; 
Lindblom, 1994; Tilling, 2004). 
 
Accidents can be defined as “discrete one-time undesirable or unfortunate events that 
happen unexpectedly in the life of a corporation and cause damage to any number or kind 
of stakeholders” (Zyglidopoulos, 2001, p420). In a world characterised by what Kiely 
(1983, pxi, cited in Zyglidopoulos, 2001, p421) called “the instant and photographic 
reporting of calamity” some accidents can receive such an extensive amount of media 
coverage that they could become landmarks in the history of a particular industry (ibid). 
This is expected to particularly be the case with accidents in the transport industry 
(Paterson and Woodward, 2006), because “they provide the permanently starved news 
media with graphic photographs that can improve their ratings” (Zyglidopoulos, 2001, 
p421).  
 
Despite the fact that CSR has been a topic of interest within the accounting profession for 
a number of years (Tilt, 2003) few studies have examined how such external events 
impact upon the provision of such disclosures (namely Patten, 1992; Walden and 
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Schwartz, 1997, Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Deegan et al, 2000; Paterson and Woodward, 
2006), even though these types of research may be “very productive in terms of adding 
insight into the role of legitimation strategies” (Lindblom, 1994, p20). All these studies 
have employed an LT-based perspective, which would be more closely associated to the 
arguments identified here as „ethics pragmatism‟. Patten (1992) and Walden and Schwartz 
(1997) studies both examined the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill on Environmental 
Disclosures on the Annual Reports of selected American industries: the oil industry for 
Patten (1992) and the oil, consumer products, chemical, and forest products industries for 
Walden and Schwartz (1997), and they both found that the levels of environmental 
disclosures increased significantly in the year following the accident.  
 
On the other hand, Deegan and Rankin (1996), Deegan et al (2000) and Paterson and 
Woodward (2006), have all attempted to examine the reactions of specific companies to 
legitimacy threats that they were directly involved in: Deegan and Ranking (1996) 
examined the variations on the Annual Report environmental disclosures of 20 Australian 
companies that had breached the environmental law; Deegan et al (2000) examined the 
variations on the Annual Report levels of CSD of 5 Australian companies to some major 
incidents that related to them, such as oil spills and mine and plant disasters; and in a 
study more relevant to the present one, Paterson and Woodward (2006) examined the 
CSD reaction of companies involved in three major transport accidents in the UK: the 
King‟s Cross Underground fire in 1987; the Paddington Rail disaster of 1999; and the 
Concorde crash outside Paris in 2000. The findings of all these studies lent support to the 
adopted more „pragmatic‟ LT arguments in that the corporations sought to address the 
legitimacy threat by increasing their disclosure of environmental or CSD information. 
 
This study attempts to contribute to this existing limited research considering 
organisations‟ CSD responses to major incidents, by primarily employing a revisited LT 
framework that allows for alternative explanations for the identified findings to be 
considered. Further, the study focuses on the aviation industry, where accidents are 
considered generally to be more „news worthy‟, with a greater impact on the corporation‟s 
overall reputation (Zyglidopoulos, 2001); it takes an international perspective since 
companies across three continents are examined; and reviews a wider array of published 
sources containing social and environmental information (when available) as the 
subsequent Section 5 on the methods further points out. Since the above studies did not 
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attempt to identify any alternative legitimacy–based perspectives as this research, they, 
consequently, employed simpler propositions from the present ones, described in detail 
below. 
 
4. Propositions  
 
A number of propositions could be drawn from the above theoretical discussion: 
 
1. Following the accident, levels of total CSD, and, 
2. Levels of Health and Safety (H&S) CSD in the company’s Annual and 
Sustainability Reports will increase. 
 
This is the central proposition of this study and is expected to hold for all three legitimacy 
based types of organisations engaging with CSR (although, the increased public pressure 
may even compel the „pristine capitalists‟ to start disclosing some voluntary CSD 
information). A possible no response strategy (O‟Donovan, 2002) or even a decrease to 
the level of CSD following the accident would clearly signify that organisations do not 
perceive CSR to be part of the requirements of an implicit social contract with their 
constituents and other theoretical explanations need to be sought (such as PE1 and PE2 or 
Institutional theory). It is expected that this would be particularly the case for the H&S 
disclosure, due to the related direct impacts of the selected accidents. 
 
3. Following the accident, levels of positive CSD, and, 
4. Levels of negative CSD in the company’s annual reports will increase. 
 
A number of large-sample studies have revealed that managers “attribute negative 
organizational outcomes to uncontrollable environmental causes and positive outcomes to 
their own actions” (Abrahamson and Park, 1994, p1302, a justification supported by 
Bowman, 1976; Bettman and Weitz, 1983; Staw et al, 1983; Salancik and Meindl, 1984). 
As Pfeffer (1981) elaborated on this, organisations would be expected to adopt strategies 
involving “the selective release of information which is… defined along criteria more 
favourable to the organization… measured along criteria which are more readily 
controlled by the organization, and… acceptable to those interested in the organization” 
(p30).  
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In the CSR context, organisations in order to regain legitimacy would be expected to 
increase the amounts of their positive CSD, in an attempt to change public perceptions 
(O‟Donovan, 2002) and to prove that they benefit society as a whole (Paterson and 
Woodward, 2006). The ethics-oriented approaches would be also expected to admit guilt 
and not conceal the negative impacts of their operations, and thus also increase the levels 
of negative CSD in their reports, following the accident. Even the image-oriented 
organisations, however, may increase their negative CSD following the accident “in an 
attempt to diffuse the situation by creating the impression … of honesty” (Savage et al, 
2000, p50).  
 
5. Following the accident, levels of substantive CSD, and, 
6. Levels of symbolic CSD in the company’s Annual Report will increase. 
 
The distinction of substantive vs symbolic legitimation has been brought forward by 
Pfeffer and colleagues (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1981, see also Richardson, 
1985; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990) and has not been employed widely in the CSR context 
(but see Savage et al, 2000; Day and Woodward, 2004). Substantive legitimation is 
evident in the works of Rousseau and Habermas and involves “real, material change to 
organizational goals, structures and processes, or in socially institutionalized practices” 
(Savage et al, 2000, p48). Symbolic legitimation on the other hand traces its roots to the 
work of Marx and Weber; it involves “the symbolic transformation of the identity or 
meaning of acts to conform to social values” and is predicated on that “the acceptance of 
authority resides in the belief in the legitimacy of the order independently of the validity 
of that order” (Richardson, 1985, p143, emphasis in original). 
  
Organisations with an ethics-oriented approach would be expected to be generally willing 
to bear the higher costs and provide more concrete, substantive information to their 
constituents; whereas, companies adopting an image-centred approach would tend to 
favour symbolic approaches, “since they are more economical and flexible than 
substantive actions” (Savage et al, 2000, p 48). Following a major legitimacy threat, 
however, even image-oriented organisations would be expected to respond with some 
substantive CSD, in an attempt, for example, to show that they conform to the higher 
performance expectations of the constituents or to alter the societal definition of 
legitimacy (ibid).  
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5. Methods  
 
The methods adopted in this study involve a longitudinal case study research design with 
Content Analysis (CA) as the data collection and analysis method. Case studies are 
frequently employed in the CSR literature (see Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Campbell, 2000; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Larrinaga- Gonzalez et al, 2001; Deegan et 
al, 2002; Mowat, 2002; Gago, 2002; Rahaman et al, 2004). This approach allows the 
researcher “to deal with the subtleties and intricacies of complex social situations” 
(Denscombe, 2003, p38), to further “explain the causal links in real-life interventions that 
are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies” (Yin, 1994, p15) and can 
therefore, ease both theory-building and theory-testing (Denscombe, 2003).  
 
A longitudinal case study approach seems to be particularly suitable for this study, since 
in order to investigate the above set propositions, companies that have faced major 
legitimacy threats need to be examined and a detailed and longitudinal analysis of the 
investigated organisation‟s CSR disclosing patterns, involving varied approaches to data 
analysis, needs to be conducted (see also Hogner, 1982; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; 
Campbell, 2000; Campbell et al, 2003 for other CSR longitudinal approaches). In contrast 
to the Paterson and Woodward‟s (2006) which employed two sample years and to Deegan 
et al‟s (2000) which employed four, the CSD of the reviewed companies is examined over 
five years around the accident (two prior to, on the year of, and two following the 
accident), in an attempt to more comprehensively review any CSD variations before and 
after the accidents.   
 
For data collection and analysis, a largely qualitative form of Content Analysis (CA) was 
employed, described in detail in Vourvachis (2007). In brief, this first involves utilising 
any sustainability reports available, in addition to the Annual Reports, as sampling units 
(data) for the analysis. For BA, this involved the inclusion in the analysis of their annually 
published Environmental Reports or their Social and Environmental Reports, where 
appropriate, and their Supplementary Data Reports. For SIA the analysis is restricted to 
the published Annual Reports, as only one Environmental Report was published in the last 
examined year.  
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With regards to the CA context, as the discussion on the study‟s propositions has 
indicated, originally four CSD classifications were adopted. These included the theme of 
CSD (for detailed categories and decision rules of which see Appendix A); the substantive 
vs symbolic CSD (a brief outline of which, based on the Savage et al [2000] study, is 
provided in Appendix B); the positive vs negative CSD (some illustrations of which are 
provided in Appendix C); and the mandatory vs voluntary CSD, originally adopted for the 
purposes of the BA case study, but later aborted (see Appendix D for what was perceived 
as UK mandatory CSD at that time).  
 
The mandatory vs voluntary CSD distinction was aborted primarily because of the 
unavailability of the relevant legislation in countries other than the UK. However, as 
Table 5.1 below illustrates, in the case of BA, generally mandatory CSD remained 
minimal and did not vary considerably throughout the examined period (from 1.87 pages 
in 1999, accounting for a 3 per cent of total CSD to 2.78 pages and 10 per cent in 2003). It 
is not expected, therefore, that the abortion of this distinction for SIA and the remaining 
case studies to have greatly affected the generated results, particularly since what is 
primarily investigated is not how much voluntary CSD is reported per se, but the change 
in reporting across the specified time periods. And as the subsequent Table 5.2 reveals, 
primarily due to the small proportion of the mandatory CSD, the voluntary CSD follows 
almost identical change patterns as the total CSD.  
 
Table 5.1: BA mandatory vs voluntary CSD (pages) in proportions of total CSD  
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
C
S
D
 
Mandatory 
1.87 1.77 2.27 2.24 2.78 
3% 3% 3% 5% 10% 
Voluntary 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
97% 97% 97% 95% 90% 
 
Total 
62.46 63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 5.2: BA mandatory vs voluntary CSD (pages and % of year to year change)  
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
C
S
D
 
Mandatory  
1.87 1.77 2.27 2.24 2.78 
(5%) 28% (1%) 24% 
Voluntary  
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
 
Total 
62.46 63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
2% 8% (28%) (38%) 
 
As recording/measurement unit, a page size approach largely based on the work of 
Hackson and Milne (1996) was employed, where “the written and pictorial part of a 
page… [is] considered to be the page itself” (Gray et al, 1995b, fn16, p90). This generally 
involved firstly counting sentences; then deriving a page measure pertaining to narrative 
information, by adjusting the sentences to an average sentences per page ratio; and finally 
adding to the latter the derived measure of the non-narrative (pictorial) information, 
including tables, graphs and images, measured by using a page-adjusted grid, to get an 
estimate of the total CSD in pages (see Vourvachis, 2007, for justifications/further details 
on this approach). This resulted in finally the CSD to be measured in sentences, pages and 
(when adjusting for the total pages for each report for Annual Reports only) proportions of 
report, in an attempt to better capture the variations in CSD. Nevertheless, as 
demonstrated later in the analysis, the results across measurement units are largely 
consistent and the page measure is employed for most illustrations.    
 
In addition to the more quantitative CA approach described above, focusing on the 
manifest content of information and employing customised pre-determined categories, 
some qualitative analysis of the collected CSD is also employed, in an attempt to generate 
some inductive categories and investigate the latent content of the analysed information. 
This largely follows the Bebbington and Gray‟s (2000) approach, which implicitly draws 
on Yin‟s (2003) „pattern matching‟ and „explanation building‟ techniques: it generally 
involves „scanning‟ the text for information that could be relevant, supporting or not, to 
each of the identified variants of the framework and also identifying data that could not be 
explained by any variant, to use as input for further refinements on the framework, in an 
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attempt to explain all the data.  The findings per case from both the quantitative and 
qualitative CA are presented next. 
 
6.  Findings  
 
6.1 The Singapore Airlines (SIA) case study 
 
6.1.1 The accident 
 
Designated as Flight 006, the wide-bodied Boeing 747 SIA jetliner crashed during taking 
off at the T‟ai-pei International Airport on the 31st of October 2000 at 23.20. The disaster 
resulted in the death of 83 of the 179 persons aboard the aircraft, including four cabin 
attendants. Among the survivors, 57 passengers and 13 crew members suffered injuries 
and 25 other persons escaped unscathed, the latter including two of the three flight 
crewmen (Gero, 2006). This was the Airline‟s first fatal accident (SIA, 2001). 
 
Authorised to use runway 05-Left, the aircraft inexplicably began its take-off on the 
adjacent 05-Right, which was partially closed due to work in progress. Slightly more than 
half a minute after commencing its ground run, at a ground speed of approximately 150 
mph (250kmh), the 747 struck several barriers, some construction equipment, including a 
bulldozer, and a pile of metal reinforcement bars that were on the runway (Gero, 2006). 
The aircraft then broke into several large pieces and caught fire. The accident occurred in 
darkness and adverse meteorological conditions that were associated with a typhoon 
located approximately 200 miles (320 km) to the south (ibid).  
 
The investigative report by the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council (ASC) concluded that 
the pilots having ignored a number of visible signs, “lost situational awareness” in 
entering and commencing take-off on the wrong runway, possibly affected by the poor 
weather and wet runway conditions. With regard to the survival issue, the ASC found that 
the airline‟s emergency evacuation training, though generally meeting the industry 
standards, did not include methods of dealing with exposure to adverse meteorological 
elements, fire and smoke. The aircraft‟s public address system also failed, and the airline 
did not seem to have a back-up plan for such a contingency (ibid). 
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A Singaporean specialist team, however, claimed that the ASC report had presented an 
“unbalanced account” of the accident, which minimised the significance of the many 
systemic factors they considered as contributory, including deficiencies in runway 
lighting, signage and markings at the airport. They viewed the cause of the disaster as “a 
failure of the aviation system”, emphasising the airport‟s deficiencies rather than the 
crew‟s errors. Although SIA (2001) originally seemed to espouse this team‟s views, they 
eventually had to comply with the ASC‟s rules and ended up settling a number of 
lawsuits. Two of the three pilots of that flight were subsequently dismissed.   
 
6.1.2 The quantitative CA evidence 
 
Despite the disagreements regarding the causes of the accident, it appears to have had an 
impact on SIA‟s CSR, as the following quantitative CA analysis of the two Annual 
Reports preceding and the three following the disaster indicate. The following Tables 
6.1.1 and 6.1.2 summarise the variations of the total Corporate Social Disclosure (CSD) 
and also, more specifically, of the Health and Safety (H&S) disclosure per measurement 
method over the selected five year period.  
 
Table 6.1.1: Total CSD per measurement unit (and % of year to year change)  
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
u
n
it
 
Sentences 
77 86 157 190 148 
12% 83% 21% (22%) 
P
ag
es
 
Narrative 
3.08 3.44 7.85 7.60 6.43 
12% 128% (3%) (15%) 
Pictorial  
1.83 2.77 4.28 6.07 7.45 
51% 55% 42% 23% 
Total  
4.91 6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
26% 95% 13% 2% 
Proportion of 
report  
5.5% 6.8% 11.4% 11.8% 11.4% 
24% 68% 4% (4%) 
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Table 6.1.2: H&S CSD per measurement unit (and % of year to year change)  
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
H
&
S
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
u
n
it
 Sentences  
8 12 36 38 22 
50% 200% 6% (42%) 
P
ag
es
 
Narrative  
0.32 0.48 1.80 1.52 0.96 
50% 275% 16% 37% 
Pictorial  
0 0.16 0.32 0 0.17 
- 100% (100%) - 
Total  
0.32 0.64 2.12 1.52 1.13 
100% 231% (28%) (26%) 
Proportion of 
report  
0.4% 0.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.9% 
75% 186% (35%) (31%) 
 
The findings strongly support propositions 1 and 2, since following the accident both the 
total and the H&S CSD levels in the company‟s reports increase, regardless of the opted 
measurement method. When considering the total CSD, this increase ranges from 68% 
(proportion of report as measurement unit) to 95% (total page size data). H&S CSD 
provide an even greater support for the proposition 1, ranging from 186% (proportion of 
report) to 231% (total pages). Total disclosures seem to continue their upward trend even 
for the next year, although in a substantially decreased rate, in a range of 4% to 21%, 
although the H&S seem to follow then a downward trend, with the exception of sentences 
(slight increase 6% versus decreases 28% and 35% for the pages and proportion of report 
measures respectively). 
 
Arguably, the levels of increased total CSD following the accident, could be perceived as 
a response to the major legitimacy threat that the whole industry faced as a whole 
following the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks, which “shattered the confidence of the 
travelling public and plunged the aviation industry into its worst financial crisis” (SIA, 
2002, p6). It is further important to note that in year 2002 SIA also published its first 
Environmental Report (SIA, 2002), which was not considered in these findings due to 
(un)availability reasons but would have further augmented the levels of CSD following 
the accident.   
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The publication of such standalone environmental reports possibly explains the low 
proportion of the environmental information to the whole of the disclosed CSR, as the 
following tables reveal, at least for that last examined year. Tables 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 
summarise the findings per theme of disclosure and as a proportion to the whole CSR 
information per year in sentences and in pages, respectively. Similarly to the above tables, 
the choice of the measurement unit does not seem to affect greatly the main drawn 
inferences. 
 
As the tables illustrate, the prevailing disclosure themes are firstly workplace and then 
marketplace, with the environment appearing to be the most „neglected‟ area of the 
Annual Report disclosure. SIA generally do seem to disclose larger quantities of 
information that could be considered of interest to their customers rather than their 
employees, such as information about the food, their seats, on-line booking systems and 
on-board entertainment; however, most of this information was not perceived to be and 
recorded as CSR, in line with the adopted inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
 
Table 6.1.3: Theme of CSD (sentences) in proportions 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Health & Safety 
8 12 36 38 22 
10% 14% 23% 20% 15% 
Marketplace 
14 10 22 36 45 
18% 12% 14% 19% 30% 
Workplace 
29 40 29 69 40 
38% 47% 18% 36% 27% 
Community 
8 8 24 11 8 
10% 9% 15% 6% 5% 
Environment 
7 4 3 6 11 
9% 5% 2% 3% 8% 
Other 
11 12 43 30 22 
14% 14% 27% 16% 15% 
 
Total 
77 86 157 190 148 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 6.1.4: Theme of CSD (pages) in proportions 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Health & Safety 
0.32 0.64 2.12 1.52 1.13 
7% 11% 17% 12% 8% 
Marketplace 
0.56 0.66 2.02 2.87 3.50 
11% 11% 17% 21% 25% 
Workplace 
2.16 2.79 2.44 5.49 6.26 
44% 45% 20% 40% 45% 
Community 
0.54 0.72 2.09 0.44 0.35 
11% 12% 17% 3% 3% 
Environment 
0.28 0.08 0.23 0.33 0.56 
6% 2% 2% 2% 4% 
Other 
1.05 1.16 3.23 3.02 2.10 
21% 19% 27% 22% 15% 
 
Total 
4.91 6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
As Tables 6.1.3 and 6.1.4 further illustrate, following the accident, the levels of disclosure 
increase for most of the CSR themes, with the exception of workplace. As a result, and 
apparently only for that year and with the exception of the environment, all the rest of the 
disclosure themes interestingly appear to be largely equally represented, with their 
proportions to the total CSD to vary from 17% (Community, Marketplace and H&S) to 
27% (Other CSD). This could be interpreted as an organisational attempt to satisfy all 
potentially affected constituents following the legitimacy threat and is further supportive 
of the adopted LT framework.   
 
The following tables allow for an assessment of the quality of the disclosed CSR and 
further refine the adopted organisational LT stance. Table 6.1.5 summarises the findings 
in terms of the positive vs negative CSD for the total and H&S disclosures.  
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Table 6.1.5: Positive vs negative CSD (in pages and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
H
&
S
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Positive  
0.28 0.54 1.58 0.84 0.97 
93% 193% (47%) 15% 
Negative  
0.04 0.06 0.54 0.64 0.12 
50% 800% 19% (81%) 
Neutral   
0 0.04 0 0.04 0.04 
- (100%) - - 
T
o
ta
l 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Positive   
4.55 5.40 10.84 7.76 9.25 
19% 101% (28%) 19% 
Negative  
0.28 0.37 0.79 4.53 1.38 
32% 114% 473% (70%) 
Neutral   
0.08 0.44 0.50 1.38 3.25 
450% 14% 176% 136% 
 
Total  
4.91 6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
26% 95% 13% 2% 
 
Both positive and negative disclosures largely follow the same patterns as total disclosure 
and strongly increase following the accident, lending support to the supportive of LT 
propositions 3 and 4 (note that a similar to Patten and Crampton (2004) attempt is made to 
view the disclosure in its context and minimise neutral disclosures). The positive and 
negative H&S disclosures increase by 193% and 800% respectively in the year following 
the accident, whereas the total positive and negative CSD increase by 101% and 114%, 
respectively. Positive disclosures then decrease whereas negative ones further increase in 
the following year.  
 
During the two years prior to the accident the main issue of concern for SIA appears to be 
the recovery from the Asian Economic crisis, which had been however “faster than 
expected” (SIA, 2001, p7); the main negative event, therefore, affecting their reporting in 
2001 was the fatal accident, which resulted in both human and financial losses. The 
decrease in positive and increase in negative CSD during 2002 is most likely because this 
appeared to be “the most difficult year in SIA‟s history” (SIA, 2002, p5), following the 
9/11 attacks. These accounted for the presence of a number of negative CSR disclosures, 
such as the levels of cancelled orders, pay cuts, and decreases in staff strength and in 
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value added to be reported. Although 2003 was still not perceived by them to be a good 
year for SIA (Iraq war, SARS), they seem to bounce back and increase their positive 
(increased value added, marginal increases in staff strength) and decrease their negative 
CSD (primarily pay cuts and less routes/destinations).   
 
Although the findings so far lend support to the first proposition, and therefore, to the 
revised Legitimacy Theory (LT) framework as a whole, they still do not assist towards 
distinguishing which of the main three LT variants could better explain SIA‟s stance 
towards CSR. This is because (a) all stakeholder capitalist, ethics pragmatist and ethics 
opportunist variants would have been expected to increase their levels of CSD to defend 
their legitimacy and (b) it is difficult to infer whether in SIA, by disclosing both positive 
and negative CSD, attempts to be honest or simply to create the impression of honesty and 
change public perceptions. Table 6.1.6 below summarises the findings in terms of the 
substantive vs symbolic CSD for the total and H&S disclosures, which appears to be a 
more useful distinction in this respect.   
 
Table 6.1.6: Substantive vs symbolic CSD (in pages and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
H
&
S
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Substantive 
0.24 0.52 1.49 1.32 1.13 
117% 187% (11%) (14%) 
Symbolic 
0.08 0.12 0.63 0.20 0 
50% 425% (68%) (100%) 
Other     
0 0 0 0 0 
- - - - 
T
o
ta
l 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Substantive 
3.29 4.97 9.53 10.90 12.15 
51% 92% 14% 11.5% 
Symbolic  
1.58 1.24 1.85 2.13 1.74 
(22%) 49% 15% (18%) 
Other    
0.04 0 0.75 0.64 0 
(100%) - (15%) (100%) 
 
Total      
4.91 6.21 12.13 13.67 13.88 
26% 95% 13% 2% 
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The findings lend strong support for LT supportive propositions 5 and 6 since following 
the accident, both levels of substantive and symbolic CSD increased. The substantive and 
symbolic H&S disclosures increased by 187% and 425% respectively, whereas the total 
substantive and symbolic CSD increased by 92% and 49%, respectively.  
 
It is important to emphasise that SIA increased to a particularly greater extent their 
symbolic rather than their substantive H&S CSD following the accident. They did so, 
mainly by considerably expanding their section devoted to renewal of the fleet in a largely 
symbolic manner, for example, often repeating information on their orders and describing 
these in much greater detail than in the past. Similarly, a large part of their total 
substantive CSD increase was because, following the accident they developed a dedicated 
one and a half page award section in the report listing all their accolades, whilst in the 
reports preceding the accident these had been described in just one sixth of a page. These 
practices lend support to Savage et al’s (2000, p48) arguments for such symbolic 
approaches being “more economical and flexible than substantive actions” and reveal an 
organisation who seem more interested to be seen to be legitimate rather than to be acting 
legitimately.  
 
Given that SIA had minimal CSD in the years preceding the accident and they seemed to 
decrease it two years following the accident, they do not seem to be acting as ethics 
opportunists, attempting “to turn a problem into economic opportunity” (Drucker, 1984, 
p62). They seem rather to be acting as ethics pragmatists, increasing disclosure in an 
attempt to defend their legitimacy and “avoid potentially damaging economic impacts on 
business” (O‟Dwyer, 1999, p328).  
 
6.1.3 The qualitative CA evidence 
 
The „pragmatic‟ orientation of SIA is more evident when a qualitative CA perspective is 
adopted. SIA seem to generally perceive their Annual Report as a means to communicate 
with their constituents, and they seem to change the focus of their reporting according to 
their perceived needs at the time, as ethics pragmatist are expected to do. In the first years 
under review, preceding the air crash, their focus was on reassuring the investors they had 
recovered from the Asian economies crisis. Consequently, the main CSR disclosure 
regarded acknowledging the contribution of their employees to this recovery, such as:  
 -25- 
“SIA‟s workforce also responded positively to help protect the airline from the 
effects of the crisis. Staff were active in minimising costs and improving 
efficiency and productivity during the year. In addition, many staff members also 
decided to forgo their annual wage increments in a marvellous display of loyalty. 
Such actions helped ease the pressures and allowed SIA to stay focused on its 
objective of delivering the best service to customers” (SIA, 1999, p5), and, 
 
“The key to such recognition has been the skill and commitment of SIA 
employees. This has been the cornerstone of the Group‟s impressive performance” 
(SIA, 2000, p12). 
 
Following the accident, however, SIA seemed to become particularly concerned with 
minimising the potential negative impacts of this legitimacy threat, primarily to their 
customers. As a result, as documented earlier, they started expanding their awards and 
general customer services sections in their report, but also simultaneously started 
emphasising their fleet renewal programmes in particular. For the first time, the 2001 
Chairman‟s statement devoted a large section to discussing the latter and the following 
extract was (the sole one) in large typeface: 
 
“SIA‟s fleet renewal programme is one of its hallmarks… but even by SIA‟s 
standards, it was a remarkable year for aircraft orders” (SIA, 2001, p6).   
 
The way that the news of the accident was presented further down on the Chairman‟s 
statement is also illustrative of how particularly concerned SIA were to offset the potential 
negative impacts to their reputation (as opposed to admitting responsibility of the accident 
as stakeholder capitalists would be expected to do):    
 
“In October, SIA scaled new heights and experienced its darkest hour in the matter 
of a few weeks. For the first time, it was ranked as the world's most admired 
airline in Fortune magazine's prestigious annual survey. This was followed by an 
almost clean sweep of the Business Traveller Asia-Pacific 2000 Annual Travel 
Awards, including 'Best International Airline'. But in the very last hour of October, 
according to Singapore time, the Airline's proud accident-free record came to an 
end on a closed runway in Taipei. SIA received praise and much goodwill for its 
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handling of the crisis, and it has pledged to recover and emerge an even better and 
stronger airline, but memories of this horrific accident, and those who passed 
away, will always remain with us” (ibid). 
 
In the next year, following the 09/11 attacks which affected the whole industry, their focus 
turned back to reassuring their investors that they were managing well the new crisis, but 
at the same time were assuring their customers that all safety and customer service 
standards were still in place, potentially considering that their image was still fragile, due 
to the previous year‟s accident:  
 
“The year ending 31 March 2002 will be remembered as the most difficult in the 
30-year history of Singapore Airlines. It was a year when staff rose to the 
challenge of weathering the tough economic and security conditions and 
positioning the Airline to prosper during the recovery… All divisions and 
subsidiaries were directed to review their budget plans. Non-essential projects 
were deferred or cancelled. Only those that were critical to maintaining service 
and safety standards, or were key platforms for future growth, were allowed to 
proceed” (SIA, 2002, p13), and,  
 
“What can be said is that SIA is doing as much as any major airline to ensure the 
safety of its passengers and crew” (ibid., p19). 
 
In 2003, SIA seemed to aim to convince their potentially resistant employees to 
permanent pay-cuts in particular, and they used their Annual Report to demonstrate that 
need. In the Chairman‟s statement for the first time the unions are mentioned and a 
detailed discussion is provided on how American and European airlines employ similar 
practices to ensure survival. The sole message in a large typeface on the statement reads:  
 
“It is, therefore, important for SIA management, staff and unions to embrace the 
realities of the new world, to change our minders, and to move forward and do the 
right things. Together I am confident we will overcome these adversities and 
emerge stronger” (p6). 
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Nevertheless, perhaps the clearest sign of the „pragmatic‟ approach that SIA adopts with 
regards to their CSR is that, although for some of their activities they attempt to show 
themselves as acting as stakeholder capitalists: 
 
“As one of the world's most successful international airlines, SIA has a special 
duty to be a responsible corporate citizen and give back to the communities where 
it operates” (SIA, 2001, p28), 
 
they end up admitting that, for example, the only reason they are engaging with CSR is 
because their constituents are concerned: 
 
“With these accomplishments, the air transport industry also accepts that its impact 
on the environment is a concern to air transport users and local communities, 
especially the people who live near airports” (SIA, 2006, p1). 
 
6.2 The British Airways (BA) case study 
 
6.2.1 The accident 
 
Following its departure from Paris‟ Charles de Gaulle Airport on a non-scheduled service 
to New York city, on 25 July 2000 the Concorde suffered is first fatal accident in this fiery 
crash 10 miles (15km) north-east of Paris, after nearly a quarter of a century of providing 
the only sustained supersonic passenger service (Gero, 2006). All 109 persons abroad, 
including the nine members of its crew, plus four others on the ground perished in the 
disaster, and an additional six persons suffered injuries.  
  
Chartered by  a German tour company and carrying passengers who were to cap their 
transatlantic trip with a Caribbean cruise, the Air France Concorde began its take-off from 
Runway 26-Right. After reaching a speed of around 200 mph (320Kmh) a tyre ran over a 
strip of metal lying on the pavement, which caused a fire on the left side of the aircraft. 
Lifting off, the jetliner was airborne for about a minute unable to maintain either speed or 
altitude, before striking a hotel and exploding 3.3 miles (5.5km) from the end of the 
runway (Gero, 2006).  
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Only the previous day, safety issues had emerged as BA was forced to admit that all seven 
of its Concorde fleet had hairline cracks in their wings and, taken together, these two 
events led to a serious concern for safety amongst both the general public and the aviation 
industry (Paterson and Woodward, 2006). As a consequence, both the French and the 
British Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) revoked Concorde‟s certificate of airworthiness. 
Although some modifications were made and the Concorde re-entered into regular service 
in November 2001, in the spring of 2003 its only two operators, Air France and British 
Airways, announced that due to low passenger loads, high maintenance cost and the 
general slowdown in the airline industry, they would terminate its service by the end of 
the year, withdrawing from use the rest of the aircraft (Gero, 2006).    
 
6.2.2 The quantitative CA evidence 
 
Despite that the accident did not directly involve British Airways (BA), the subsequent 
grounding of their Concorde fleet and the increased public concern for safety, appear to 
have had an impact on BA‟s CSR as the following quantitative CA analysis of the Annual 
and Sustainability reports preceding and following the disaster indicate. Tables 6.2.1 and 
6.2.2 summarise the variations of the total and H&S voluntary CSD per measurement 
method over the selected period. 
 
Table 6.2.1: Total voluntary CSD per measurement unit (and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
u
n
it
 
Sentences 
721 1,027 1,056 951 544 
42% 3% (10%) (43%) 
P
ag
es
 
Narrative  
26.54 36.83 33.78 20.61 16.27 
39% (8%) (39%) (21%) 
Pictorial  
34.05 25.12 32.81 26.42 11.64 
(26%) 31% (20%) (56%) 
Total  
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
% of Annual 
Report 
7.8% 4.3% 5.5% 5.7% 5.3% 
(45%) 30% 4% (7%) 
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Table 6.2.2: H&S voluntary CSD per measurement unit (and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
H
&
S
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 p
er
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
u
n
it
 Sentences  
97 134 202 161 140 
38% 51% (20%) (13%) 
P
ag
es
 
Narrative 
3.57 4.79 6.49 3.51 4.23 
34% 35% (46%) 21% 
Pictorial  
7.69 4.19 9.15 8.04 3.40 
(46%) 118% (12%) (58%) 
Total  
11.26 8.98 15.64 11.55 7.63 
(20%) 74% (26%) (34%) 
% of Annual 
Report 
1.5% 0.5% 0.9% 1.2% 1.6% 
(67%) 80% 33% 33% 
  
The findings support propositions 1 and 2 since following the accident both the total and 
the H&S CSD levels in the company‟s reports increase, regardless of the opted 
measurement method and then start decreasing in the subsequent years. For total 
voluntary CSD the increase ranges from 3% (sentences) to 30% (proportion of Annual 
Report). The support is greater for proposition 2, where the H&S voluntary CSD increase 
in the year of the accident ranges from 51% (sentences) to 80% (proportion of Annual 
Report). Both the total and the H&S voluntary CSD levels in BA‟s reports progressively 
decrease in the subsequent to the accident years, giving further support to propositions 1 
and 2.  
  
The following two tables break down the variance of total voluntary CSD in terms of type 
of reporting. As Table 6.2.3 illustrates, the Annual Report accounted only from 4% (year 
2000) to 13% (year 2003) of the total voluntary CSD across the sampled years. This 
finding further supports Unerman‟s (2000) empirically verified conclusion that “future 
studies focusing exclusively on annual reports might not produce particularly relevant 
results” (p674). In general, it seems that the sustainability reports operate as an appendix 
to the Annual Reports, where frequent references to the former are made. Particularly in 
the last two examined years, internet reporting is also frequently referenced on both 
Annual and Sustainability Reports. 
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Table 6.2.3: Source of voluntary CSD (in pages) in proportions 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
R
ep
o
rt
 
Annual Report  
5.64 2.76 3.53 3.62 3.63 
9% 4% 5% 8% 13% 
Sustainability 
Report 
36.11 40.29 39.41 21.41 15.66 
60% 65% 59% 46% 56% 
Supplementary 
Data 
18.84 18.90 23.65 22.00 8.62 
31% 31% 36% 46% 31% 
 
Total 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 6.2.4: Source of voluntary CSD (in pages and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
R
ep
o
rt
 
Annual Report  
5.64 2.76 3.53 3.62 3.63 
(51%) 28% 3% - 
Sustainability 
Report 
36.11 40.29 39.41 21.41 15.66 
12% (2%) (46%) (27%) 
Supplementary 
Data 
18.84 18.90 23.65 22.00 8.62 
- 25% (7%) (61%) 
 
Total 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
2% 8% (29%) (41%) 
  
As evident in Table 6.2.4, the 8% increase on the total CSD following the accident is 
mainly due to the 25% increase in the supplementary data. It should be noted, however, 
that in this kind of reporting following the accident, often BA seems to provide 
information just for the sake of increasing the published CSD (particularly given that this 
type of data are only available on-line and are exclusively in tabular form, they are thus a 
cheap way of doing so). For example, in the Supplementary Data 2001 they provide a 
table for the conservation organisations assisted in 1999/2000 and then, with the 
intermission of one table, they provide an additional table with the conservation 
organisations assisted in 2000/2001, containing exactly the same organisations. In other 
cases, eg Supplementary Data 2001, pp22-23, they provide separate tables to discuss their 
noise impacts on Heathrow and Gatwick and then subsequently, they put the two tables 
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together to form a third table for comparisons, and thus repeat CSD without adding 
additional information. The fact that BA proportionally increases the use of this flexible 
and cheap publication method in the two years following the accident, signifies an 
organisation particularly image-concerned rather than ethics-motivated towards CSR.  
 
Table 6.2.5 summarises the findings per theme of CSD and as a proportion to the whole 
CSR information per year in pages. It appears that, following the accident, the levels of 
disclosure increase for most of the CSR themes, with the marginal exception of the 
Marketplace. The prevailing disclosure theme is environment, originally accounting for 
half of the CSD in 1999, when an Environmental Report rather than a Social and 
Environmental Report (as in the subsequent years) was published, to then gradually 
decrease to account for about a quarter of the total CSD by the end of the five year period. 
H&S originally drops, but in the post-accident years it follows an upward trend to equal, 
in the last examined year environment‟s proportion, the most popular disclosing theme, 
doubling its proportion from the last pre-accident year. This can be further interpreted as 
an organisational attempt to address their threatened legitimacy following the accident 
with regards to this area. The September 11
th
 2001 events with their dire effects on the 
industry as a whole (BA, 2002b) and the appearance of the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in these post-accident years may have further threatened the legitimacy 
of the whole industry and subsequently contributed towards this H&S post-accident 
proportional increase.  
 
The findings in terms of positive vs negative CSD for the total and H&S disclosures are 
summarised in Table 6.2.6. As the Table shows, following a drop in the preceding year, 
both positive and negative disclosures increased in the first year following the accident 
before dropping in the subsequent years, lending support to the supportive of LT 
propositions 3 and 4. As in the case of SIA, the positive and negative H&S disclosures 
increase at even higher rates than the total CSD (in the BA case, almost three times as 
high). It is further interesting to note that, particularly for total CSD, the increases in 
positive and negative CSD are at a higher rate than the increase in total CSD and therefore 
this is at the expense of the neutral CSD, which started dropping even from the first post-
accident year. In the second and third post-accident years both positive and negative, total 
and H&S CSD largely follow similar declining patters to the total CSD, despite the 
aforementioned September 11
th
 events and the appearance of SARS in this period. 
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Table 6.2.5: Theme of voluntary CSD (pages) in proportions 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
T
y
p
e 
o
f 
D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Health & Safety 
11.26 8.98 15.64 11.55 7.63 
19% 14% 24% 24% 27% 
Marketplace 
6.35 8.91 8.77 6.90 1.19 
10% 14% 13% 15% 4% 
Workplace 
4.72 6.53 6.94 4.56 4.23 
8% 11% 10% 10% 15% 
Community 
1.36 4.56 4.63 2.85 2.19 
2% 7% 7% 6% 8% 
Environment 
30.03 19.84 21.99 17.79 7.59 
50% 32% 33% 38% 27% 
Other 
6.87 13.13 8.62 3.38 5.08 
11% 21% 13% 7% 18% 
 
Total 
60.59 61.95 66.59 47.03 27.91 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 6.2.6: Positive vs negative CSD (in pages and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
H
&
S
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Positive   
5.18 4.91 6.83 4.51 4.50 
(5%) 39% (34%) - 
Negative  
3.36 3.14 6.61 6.19 2.40 
(7%) 111% (6%) (61%) 
Neutral   
3.03 1.17 2.59 1.01 0.82 
(61%) 121% (61%) (19%) 
T
o
ta
l 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Positive   
35.28 32.15 36.75 24.57 16.81 
(9%) 14% (33%) (32%) 
Negative  
19.66 18.23 24.92 19.20 9.47 
(7%) 37% (23%) (51%) 
Neutral   
7.52 13.34 7.19 5.50 4.41 
77% (46%) (24%) (20%) 
 
Total  
62.46 63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
2% 8% (28%) (38%) 
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Table 6.2.7 below summarises the findings in terms of the substantive vs symbolic CSD 
for the total and H&S disclosures. Although the evidence from both the H&S and the total 
CSD lend support for proposition 5, since clearly substantive CSD increases in the first 
post-accident year, for proposition 6 the findings are inconclusive: the symbolic H&S 
CSD increases in a similar rate to the substantive one but the symbolic total CSD declines 
in the first post-accident year. At first sight, this finding may signify an ethics oriented 
organisation, primarily concentrated in addressing in a substantive way their stakeholders 
increased expectations; however, when seen in conjunction with the H&S related 
evidence, and when it is also taken into account the fact that both the H&S and total 
substantive CSD fall in the subsequent years, it may be tentatively suggested that, on the 
whole, the substantive vs symbolic evidence signifies a rather image oriented and 
pragmatic organisational stance toward CSR, where priority is given on defending their 
legitimacy rather than opportunistically or ethically extending it.  
 
Table 6.2.7: Substantive vs symbolic CSD (in pages and % of year to year change) 
 Pre-accident Post-accident 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
H
&
S
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Substantive  
8.99 6.23 10.96 9.56 4.54 
(31%) 76% (13%) (53%) 
Symbolic  
2.05 2.59 4.34 1.95 2.77 
26% 68% (55%) 42% 
Other     
0.52 0.41 0.73 0.20 0.41 
(21%) 78% (73%) 105% 
T
o
ta
l 
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 
Substantive  
42.82 36.86 46.09 35.79 18.87 
(14%) 25% (22%) (47%) 
Symbolic  
15.53 21.51 19.88 11.66 8.82 
39% (8%) (41%) (24%) 
Other      
4.11 5.35 2.89 1.82 3.00 
30% (46%) (37%) 65% 
 
Total      
62.46 63.72 68.86 49.27 30.69 
2% 8% (28%) (38%) 
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6.2.3 The qualitative CA evidence 
 
The qualitative analysis of BA‟s Annual and Sustainability reports reveals an 
organisational stance towards CSR which varies from stakeholder pragmatism to ethics 
opportunism but which is however predominantly pragmatic. This is evident from the pre-
accident years. Although, for example, BA state that they support the UK government‟s 
interpretation of sustainable development as “a better quality of life for everyone, now and 
for generations to come” (2000, p10), seemingly adopting an ethical stance, further on in 
the same report they also appear to be opportunistically driven, when in their code of 
conduct they specify that they would “consider social, ethical and environmental 
implications of decisions which will promote shareholder value” (ibid, p4). Considerably 
more frequent, however, seem to be the signs revealing that CSR is pragmatically 
perceived by BA as a condition for maintaining economic success:  
 
“While financial performance is the primary concern, our ability to sustain a 
thriving business depends also on consideration for the environment on a local and 
global scale, and on our relationships with those who are legitimate stakeholders in 
our business. Only if we pay due attention to these areas will aviation be able to 
prosper in a world which is maintained in a fit state for future generations… if we 
are to add value to our products and to our stakeholders we must be proactive in 
addressing the relevant and environmental issues” (ibid, p2). 
 
This pragmatic perception of CSR may also explain the frequent attempts to question the 
industry‟s contribution to the climate change and to further emphasise their contribution to 
the economy over the potential negative environmental impacts, which are also evident in 
this period: 
 
“there are still questions about the impact of aviation on the environment, in 
particular in relation to climate change … We also need to understand better the 
economic contribution that is made by the airline and aviation (BA, 2000, p10)… 
But British Airways also makes a substantial contribution to economic and social 
progress in the UK and other countries where we operate. A comprehensive audit 
of our performance as a sustainable business needs to take into account all three 
dimensions – economic, social and environmental” (ibid, p12). 
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In the post accident years, BA‟s CSR focus does not appear to change, despite that in 
addition to the grounding of Concorde a number of other adversities such as the economic 
slowdown, foot and mouth disease, and the rise on oil price also occurred
10
.  Their image–
concentrated and clearly non ethical CSR orientation is perhaps most apparent when BA 
explicitly admit that their the production of their sustainability report and their support in 
community and conservation programmes are all means of improving their reputation, 
following the advice of their independent assurors:  
 
“Improve reputation enhancement: The Marketing and Communications 
Department is increasingly involved in relevant activities, including operation of 
this report, „Change for Good‟ and the „Tourism for Tomorrow‟ awards 
programme” (BA, 2002a, p7). 
 
As in the pre-accident period, BA at times appear to employ CSR arguments in an 
opportunistic fashion in the reports following the accident, albeit less frequently than 
when they appear to be pragmatically driven. Often these opportunistic arguments are 
over Heathrow airport expansion, where their headquarters and their business interests lie:    
 
“Regions such as the West Midlands and Scottish Lowlands will require additional 
runway capacity over the study period to meet local demand – we support their 
view. Nevertheless, we do not consider that it is a viable alternative for the regions 
to attempt to meet South East demand. To do so would impose unnecessary, long 
and environmentally damaging surface journeys on travellers. We consider there 
are strong environmental arguments in favour of concentrating new capacity at 
existing airports – both in the regions and in the South East. Such concentration 
minimises the need for additional land take, reduces the spread of noise and 
provides greater potential for investment in surface transport links” (BA, 2002a, 
p25). 
 
Some of the arguments are on the verge of ethics pragmatism and opportunism. This is 
hardly surprising given that both the perspectives maintain an image orientation towards 
                                                 
10
 As with SIA, these adversities had reached their climax by the third post-accident year following the 
September 11
th
 events, the war in Iraq and the appearance of SARS. As BA (2003) note, “a press article 
summed it up when it suggested that the aviation industry must feel it has been assailed by the Four 
Horsemen of the Apocalypse in recent years” (p3). 
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CSR and principally relate it with profitability, either in terms of maintaining 
(pragmatists) or extending the latter (opportunists). For example, when BA explain the 
potential „business reasons‟ for adopting CSR: 
 
“Apart from the fact that British Airways believes in social responsibility, 
including environmental care and concern for the communities we serve and in 
which we work, there are sound business reasons for this. Consumers will more 
and more judge a company on its integrity and ethics, as well as the value of its 
commercial products and services” (BA, 2003, p3),  
 
It is not clear whether CSR is viewed as a necessary, „pragmatic‟ activity to satisfy the 
increased consumer expectations and maintain legitimacy and, consequently, profitability 
or as a means of opportunistically “attracting „patient‟ shareholders and enhancing the 
firm‟s reputation and brand value” (Clikeman, 2004, p25) in order to “establish new 
markets, gain additional market share, and/or increase market size though… increased 
customer loyalty” (Dillard et al, 2005, p86).   
 
Nevertheless, in most of the arguments, and similarly in the pre-accident period, it is 
apparent that BA are primarily externally motivated towards CSR, projecting to their 
constituents that they are interested in “profits AND social responsibility” (Henderson, 
1984, p170) as this rather pragmatic declaration of priorities also indicates: 
 
“Our principal objectives in the current year, however, will be to achieve increased 
levels of value and quality for our customers around the world; the continued 
support of our employees; and increased profitability – all of which are expected 
to improve the level of return for shareholders” (BA, 2001a, p4). 
  
In this period, as the quantitative evidence also suggests, increased emphasis on their 
H&S responsibilities seems to be paid in a potential attempt to defend and restore 
legitimacy. For example, and despite that even in the pre-accident years BA have noted 
that “safety is of absolute importance… we will never compromise safety for commercial 
reasons” (BA, 2000, p3), it is only in the first sustainability report following the accident 
that the following clause on their Key Issues section on Air safety appears (BA, 2001b, 
p48) and then repeated in the next report (2002a, p28): 
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“Air safety: this is of paramount importance and the matter is reviewed directly by 
a standing committee of the main corporate board. Risks are under constant review 
and are assessed within a culture of openness”.  
 
The emphasis on H&S is accompanied by even more frequent references to the 
contribution of aviation, that could be potentially perceived as a symbolic strategy to 
improve their threatened image, or even as a substantive one to alter the definition of 
social legitimacy by attempting to change the perceptions of their constituents (Perrow, 
1970; Lindblom, 1994). Although both these strategies could have also been employed by 
an opportunistically-driven organisation, given that the particular references were also 
present, though to a lesser extent in the pre-accident years, they more likely signify a 
pragmatic effort to defend legitimacy:  
 
“What aviation can provide, in part, and facilitate as an essential component of the 
global communication network, is creation of wealth necessary for education, 
health and welfare, which, in turn, prime a virtuous cycle leading to an overall 
more sustainable society” (BA, 2001b, p4). “The aviation industry also generates 
socio-political external benefits which are more difficult to measure empirically” 
(2002a, p4).  
 
The increased emphasis on the contribution of aviation is however not in conjunction with 
further attempts to question the industry‟s contribution to the climate change as in the pre-
accident years. On the contrary, BA appear to start acknowledging, without reservation, 
their environmental impact. This shift could be potentially part of a substantive 
organisational attempt for „role performance‟ through engagement with their stakeholders 
as well as a symbolic admission of guilt aiming for ceremonial conformity. Given 
however that it occurred following the accident, it could be interpreted as a further sign of 
a pragmatic attempt to defend and restore legitimacy:  
 
“it has long been recognised that emissions from aircraft engines contribute to the 
build up of greenhouse gases. Aircraft and related ground operations also 
contribute to local air quality. The aviation industry is continually looking at 
initiatives to reduce these emissions through research, development and co-
operation. We must continue our innovative work in this area” (BA, 2002a, p20). 
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7. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was twofold: it first introduced a revisited Legitimacy Theory 
(LT) framework and then moved to empirically consider its applicability by examining the 
reaction of international aviation companies, in terms of Annual and Sustainability 
Reports disclosure, to some major social accidents. The accidents reviewed so far include 
the Concorde crash north of Paris (2000) and its effect on the reporting of British Airways 
(BA) and the Singapore Airlines (SIA) accident at T‟ai-pei. 
 
An attempt was made for the revisited LT framework to incorporate most of the oft-cited 
in the literature theoretical explanations for CSR. A principal condition of the framework 
is that legitimacy is perceived here as an operational resource on which organisations are 
dependent for survival. Considering this, three LT variants of organisations employing 
CSR were identified: the stakeholder capitalists, where organisations are morally-
motivated; the ethics pragmatists, where organisations engage with CSR to satisfy critical 
stakeholders; and the ethics opportunists, where CSR is employed to extend profitability. 
Organisations under both the latter two variants would be particularly image-concentrated, 
primarily interested to be seen as legitimate rather in acting legitimately.  
 
A number of propositions were drawn from the discussion of the framework, in brief 
predicting that the levels of total and H&S, positive and negative and substantive and 
symbolic CSD would increase following the accident. To investigate the propositions a 
volumetric Content Analysis (CA) approach employing a number of methods related to 
the propositions classifications and examining Annual and Sustainability Reporting data 
was adopted. The volumetric CA was complemented by a qualitative analysis approach, 
similar to the one adopted by Bebbington and Gray (2000), in an attempt to investigate the 
latent, in addition to the manifest, content of the analysed information. 
 
The findings for SIA and BA, from both the quantitative and the qualitative CA, seem to 
provide support for the identified ethics pragmatist variant of the LT framework. In the 
case of SIA, in particular, the quantitative CA evidence provides strong support for all LT 
propositions. As expected, the levels of CSD, and more particularly the H&S type, in 
SIA‟s Annual Reports increased considerably following the accident. This is also the case 
for their positive and negative and their symbolic and substantive CSD. In particular, the 
 -39- 
latter distinction, along with the accompanying qualitative analysis, further illustrates that 
SIA‟s LT stance is close to the „ethics pragmatist‟ exemplar.  
 
For BA, as opposed to SIA, a number of Sustainability and Supplementary Data Reports, 
in addition to the Annual Reports, were reviewed and consequently the qualitative 
evidence made a relatively higher contribution to the analysis. As expected, the levels of 
voluntary CSD, and again more particularly the H&S type, on BA‟s Annual and 
Sustainability Reports increased following the accident. This is also the case for their 
positive and negative and largely for the symbolic and substantive CSD. It is particularly 
the qualitative analysis, though, which demonstrates clearly that BA adopts a non-ethical 
and mostly pragmatic stance towards CSR, with particular emphasis on employing it as a 
means of improving their reputation.  
 
It is important to note that, although the findings support the identified as „pragmatic‟ LT 
perspective, largely incorporating the „conventional‟ LT arguments as well as the MAST, 
public pressure and institutional arguments, it is still not possible to assert with certainty 
which of these individual perspectives is primarily motivating either SIA or BA towards 
CSR. In principle, all these arguments could be at play and, for example, BA could have 
increased their CSD following the accident because of the increased media coverage 
reflecting or shaping the public concern, or even as an attempt to conform to 
institutionalised pressures.   
 
Nevertheless, the employment of such an all-inclusive theoretical framework allowed for 
more than one theoretical explanation to be considered when reviewing both the 
quantitative and the qualitative evidence. This seemed to indeed empirically support that 
the above „pragmatic‟ arguments were behind SIA and BA‟s CSR, rather than some 
ethical or opportunistic ones (such as, for example, PE, decision making, or competitive 
advantage arguments), despite the existence of some limited supporting evidence, 
primarily of qualitative nature. In this achieved „theoretical reduction‟ the role of the 
employed Bebbington and Gray‟s (2000) qualitative analysis approach, involving the use 
„patterns matching‟ and „explanations building‟ techniques were prominent. It seems, 
therefore, reasonable to recommend the use of a wide range of theoretical lenses and the 
adoption of primarily qualitative approaches in future research efforts attempting to 
investigate motivations for CSR. 
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Evidently, most of the quantitative analysis was built on the premise that levels of CSD 
would increase following the accidents. However, studies which have examined CSD 
within Annual Reports indicate that it has been increasing across time, both in number of 
disclosing companies and in the amount of information being reported (Deegan et al, 
2000, 2002; see also Ernst and Ernst, 1978; Harte and Owen, 1991; Gray et al, 1995a; 
Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Thus, before attributing the potential identified increased 
CSD levels in the company‟s Annual Report to the preceding threat, it should be made 
certain that this increase is relatively higher to the potential increases of the level of CSD 
in the Annual Reports of similar (in terms of size, industry, country of origin) companies, 
which faced no threats at the same time. So far, when interpreting the collected evidence, 
such comparisons have not yet been made and this undoubtedly presents a major 
limitation for the quantitative CA in particular. It is, nevertheless, intended in a later stage 
of this research to employ both secondary CSR survey data as well as to conduct a case 
study of an aviation company which in the same period of time had faced no threats, in 
order to make such comparisons possible.  
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Appendix A: The CSD Theme Categories and Decision Rules 
 
I Health and Safety 
 
1. Health and safety at the workplace 
- Any reference/compliance to health and safety law 
- Information to employees, training on health and safety 
- Accidents, with reference to the employees 
- Receiving safety awards 
- Conducting research to improve work safety 
- Standard injury, lost day and absentee rates and number of work-related fatalities 
- Description of policies or programmes on specific diseases (eg HIV/AIDS) 
- Providing information on industrial action related to health and safety 
- Incidents of air rage (0.5) 
- Reference to aircraft age (0.5), when not linked with noise (3) or emissions (14) or 
energy (15)  
 
2. Health and safety at the marketplace  
- Health and safety of the product 
- Accidents, with reference to the customers 
- Description of policy for preserving customer health and safety during use of 
products and services 
- Extent to which these policies are visibly stated and applied 
- Monitoring systems and results of monitoring of these policies 
- Incidents of air rage (0.5) 
- Reference to aircraft age (0.5), when not linked with noise (3) or emissions (14) or 
energy (15) 
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3. Health and safety of community  
- Description of policies to manage health and safety impacts on communities affected 
by organisational activities 
- Extent to which these policies are visibly stated and applied 
- Monitoring systems and results of monitoring these policies  
- Disclosures regarding noise: infringements, fines, plane night movements 
- Reference to aircraft age when linked with noise 
- Reference to Continuous Descent Approach (CDA) and departures on track 
 
4. Health and safety – other  
- Other general issues regarding health and safety 
 
II Marketplace 
 
5. Consumers 
- Consumer complaints and related awards  
- Congestion, when linked with customer delays but not additional fuel (15)  
- Specific customer relations (over and beyond „our duty to the customer‟) 
- Provision for disabled, aged, etc customers 
- Provision for difficult to reach customers 
- Training employees in customer service (0.5) 
- Consumer privacy policy, procedures/management systems and compliance 
mechanisms 
- Expansions in the route network (but NOT information on their first class offers or 
dietary offers) 
- Consultation with consumers (frequency, information generated, use of information) 
 
6.  Creditors 
- Specific creditor relations  
- Policies with regards to creditors 
- Consultation with creditors (frequency, information generated, use of information) 
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III Workplace  
 
7. Employee and pension data 
- Statutory average numbers employed by category and wages (including pension and 
social security costs) and geographic area 
- Statutory numerical analysis of employees > £30,000 
- Statutory disclosures of directors‟ emoluments (but not their bios) 
- Thanks to employees  
- Donations ditto by/ through employees (0.5) 
- Statutory particulars for commitments for pensions, whether or not provided 
- Pensions and benefits beyond coverage of statutory material  
- Any other employee information, not covered in the below categories, including 
reference to social audits  
 
8. Equal opportunities and employee development – training  
- Training above health and safety 
- Training employees in customer service (0.5) 
- Training employees in environmental issues (0.5) 
- Average hours of training per year per employee by category of employee 
- General employee development  
- Description of equal opportunity policies or programmes (racial, sexual equality, 
parental leave, etc) and policies on harassment and bullying 
- Statutory reference to the employment of disabled persons (including retraining) 
- Monitoring systems to ensure compliance – results of monitoring 
- Indicators of diversity as culturally appropriate (eg female/male ration in senior 
management and corporate governance bodies) 
- Policies/references to bribery and corruption in the marketplace 
 
9. Human rights  
- Policies, guidelines, corporate structure and procedures to deal with all aspects of 
human rights relevant to operations, including immigration/ asylum seekers‟ cases 
- Consideration of human rights within the supply chain and on selection of suppliers/ 
contractors, excluding collective bargaining/ references to industrial relations  
- Description of policy excluding child labour as defined by the ILO Convention 138 
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- Description of policy to prevent forced and compulsory labour and extent to which 
this policy is visibly stated and applied 
- Any information/ statutory reference to employment in South Africa (before official 
end of apartheid – 1990), statement of compliance with code and / or submission to 
DTI  
- Monitoring systems of the above policies and results of monitoring  
 
10. Consultation with employees 
- Statutory action with respect to informing employees on matters of concern, 
consulting employees or representatives, encouraging (and engaging in) employee 
participation 
- Statutory increasing employee financial and economic awareness  
- Reference to industrial relations, strike action or talks with unions 
- Employee opinion surveys and individual advice and counselling 
 
11. Share ownership  
- Statutory encouragement and participation of employees in share schemes, profit 
sharing, ESOPs, where employees does not mean directors 
- Schemes/ reference must be to employees (exclude if reference is to executive or 
directors only)  
- Loans for this purpose but not directors 
- SAYE options  
 
IV Community 
 
12. Community involvement  
- Any reference to community and/ or social involvement outside the labour force 
- Sponsoring/ funding schools, arts, sports, medical research, development of local 
communities/ industries and activities  
- Particular reference to bribery and corruption in communities 
- Consultation with community (frequency, information generated, use of 
information) 
- Excluding charities  
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13. Charities  
- Statutory donations in monetary form or in kind to registered charities within the 
Company Act 
- Donations ditto by/ through employees (eg GAYE schemes) (0.5) 
- Include statutory references and amounts of political donations (as they fall within 
the same Company Act requirement)  
 
V. Environment 
 
14. Environmental pollution  
- Air, Water (including consumption), emissions, visual quality, fuel jettison (0.5) and 
pollution plus any attempt to identify, improve or prevent 
- Environmental audits  
- Conservation of natural resources, waste and recycling including improvements in 
products 
- Commitment to sustainable development  
- Statements indicating that the company‟s operations are in compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations; recognition of the need to comply with society 
standards and regulations  
- Involvements with schemes (eg Business in the Environment, Business in 
Community, ACBE, etc) 
- Except in so far as its part of the business (eg waste disposal or environmental 
technology) 
- Environmental Awards won or external praise for environmental work 
- Reference to aircraft age when linked to emissions 
 
15. Energy 
- Energy saving and conservation  
- Fuel (ie oil, gas) and electricity consumption, fuel jettison (0.5) 
- Use/ development/ exploration of new sources, efficiency, insulation, etc 
- Except in so far as it is part of the business (eg oil exploration companies) 
- Utilising waste materials for energy production 
- Disclosing energy savings resulting from product recycling 
- Discussing the company‟s efforts to reduce energy consumption  
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- Disclosing increased energy efficiency of products 
- Receiving awards for energy conservation programmes 
- Disclosing the company‟s energy policies  
- Reference to aircraft age when linked to energy savings 
- Reference to congestion when linked to additional fuel 
 
16.  Aesthetics  
- Designing facilities harmonious with the environment 
- Contributions in the terms of case or art/sculptures to beautify the environment 
- Restoring historical buildings/structures  
- General environmental activities linked with tourism 
 
17.  Environment – other  
- Undertaking environmental impact studies to monitor the company‟s impact on the 
environment, conducting reviews of performance, employing specialist consultants  
- Wildlife conservation, environmental newsletters and biodiversity 
- Training employees in environmental issues (0.5)  
 
VI. Other 
 
18. Value added statement 
- Any reference to the creation and distribution of value added 
- Any statement headed valued added or added value 
- Any statement with „distribution‟ to employees and state (not including 
shareholders)  
 
19. Other CSR information  
- For example, general CSR objectives and mission statements; ethics; political 
statements; value of company to nation, economy; assurance statements; general 
references to stakeholders and competitors.  
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Appendix B (I): The Substantive and Symbolic Strategies Employed in 
the Savage et al (2000) Study 
 
Substantive strategies 
1. Role performance. This is perceived by Savage et al as “the most obvious attempt at 
legitimation” (p48) and is where the organisation adapts its goals, methods or 
operation, and/or its output to conform to the performance expectations of the 
members of society on whom it depends for critical resources (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975). These organisations would thus be expected to disclose more frequently 
quantitative and also at times negative CSD. 
2. Coercive isomorphism. This is the basic tenet of institutional theory. Organisations 
employ substantive legitimation to become isomorphic with their cultural 
environment, by employing substantive strategies or by shifting from symbolic 
strategies to substantive over time. 
3. Altering socially institutionalised practices. Organisations could attempt, through 
communication, to alter the societal definition of legitimacy, so that the amended 
definition reflects the organisation‟s activities (Lindblom, 1994): the most difficult 
strategy to successfully implement (Savage et al, 2000).  
 
Symbolic strategies 
4. Espousing socially acceptable goals. Organisations may do so while pursuing less 
acceptable ones. They may, for example, disclose ethical policies but fail to 
implement procedure to monitor compliance.  
5. Denial and Concealment. Organisations may do so for activities that may undermine 
legitimacy (see Sutton and Calahan, 1987). 
6. Identification with symbols, values or institutions. The organisation could attempt to 
become identified with symbols, values or institutions with a strong established base 
of social legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Lindblom, 1994). 
7. Offering accounts. Organisations may offer explanations, including excuses and 
justifications or putting the blame to someone else (Paterson and Woodward, 2006). 
This is still an attempt to shape perceptions of the organisation (O‟Donovan, 2002). 
8. Offering apologies. By apologising, organisations may show some expression of 
remorse for a negative event (Savage et al, 2000). 
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9. Ceremonial conformity. Highly visible and salient practices that are consistent with 
social expectations may be adopted, while leaving the formal structure of the 
organisation intact; for example, organisations may form a task force to study the 
environmental impact of activities; this may provide the appearance of action 
without the substance (ibid). 
10. Admission of guilt. Organisations may acknowledge partial responsibility to create 
the impression and/or reality of honesty. Should be followed by increased negative 
CSD. 
11. Misrepresentation or open to misinterpretation. The organisation may intentionally 
or unintentionally give a false impression or account or supply ambiguous 
information that could be misleading or open to misinterpretation (ibid). 
12. Avoiding, trivialising or skirting around the issue. The organisation may offer a 
partial explanation, trivialise or fail to directly address an issue. The information 
may not be clearly conveyed or may simply be implied (ibid, O‟Donovan, 2002). 
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Appendix B (II): The Substantive and Symbolic Strategies Employed in 
the BA Study 
 
Substantive strategies 
1. Role performance [act as expected]: as above Savage et al strategy 1 
2. Coercive isomorphism [act as everybody does]: as above strategy 2 
3. Altering socially institutionalised practices [Change what is expected]: as above 
strategy 3] 
 
Symbolic strategies [show acting as expected] 
4. Espousing goals and symbols [change (improve) overall image]: as above strategy 4, 
but including above strategies 6 and 9 
5. Denial, concealment/avoidance and trivialisation of potential detrimental issues 
[downgrade detrimental activities]: as above strategies 5, 11 and 12 
6. Offering accounts and apologies [downgrade organisational role towards 
detrimental activities]: as above strategies 7, 8 and 10  
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Appendix C: Examples of Positive and Negative CSD 
 
Positive CSD 
 
- Noise infringements: decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Noise fines: decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Fuel consumption: decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Emissions: decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Accidents: decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Continuous Descent Approach (DCA): increasing trends or maintaining trends or 
decreasing trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or 100% of flights (1.0) 
- Departures on Track: increasing trends or maintaining trends or decreasing trends 
(but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or 100% of flights (1.0) 
- Decreasing trend refers to the last two years in comparison, even if the previous 
years in a table or graph indicate an increasing trend 
- Recycling of materials 
- Decrease of average aircraft age 
- Compliance with government environmental reports and standards 
- Merits of the company‟s environmental position 
- Maintenance or implementation of a strategy to protect the environment 
- Voluntary adoption of safe environmental practices 
- Introduction of environmental audits 
- Statement of company aim or mission to protect the environment 
- Energy-saving measures 
- Research into, or support of, environmentally safe products and practices 
- Undertaking of environmental impact or assessment studies 
- Evidence of public support/approval of the company‟s social and environmental 
activities 
- Sponsor or recipient of social and environmental achievement awards 
- Company in harmony with the environment 
- Establishment of wildlife preservations areas 
- Improvements in environmental standards/facilities 
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Negative CSD 
 
- Noise infringements: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or 
decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Noise fines: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or decreasing 
trends (0.5) 
- Fuel consumption: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or 
decreasing trends (0.5) 
- Emissions: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or decreasing 
trends (0.5) 
- Accidents: increasing or maintaining trends or absence of trends (1.0) or decreasing 
trends (0.5) 
- Continuous Descent Approach (DCA): Increasing trends (but not 100%) or 
maintaining trends or decreasing trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or reported 
absence (0% - 1.0) 
- Departures on track: Increasing trends (but not 100%) or maintaining trends or 
decreasing trends (but not 0%) or no trends (0.5) or reported absence (0% - 1.0) 
- Increasing or maintaining trend refers to the last two years in comparison, even if the 
previous years in a table or a graph indicate a decreasing trend 
- Company in conflict with the government view on its environmental activities 
- Admission of causing environmental, including health-related, problems for 
residents through the company‟s environmental activities 
- Increase of average aircraft age 
- Non-compliance with regulations 
- Admission of past problems with the company‟s environmental activities 
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Appendix D: CSR Required by Legislation and Professional Guidance in 
the UK 
Area of Disclosure 
(a) 
Information to be Disclosed 
(b) 
Relevant Legislation 
(c) 
Health and Safety Particulars of significant changes in the fixed assets 
and important events affecting the company which 
have occurred in or since the end of the financial 
year [to the extent that these events and changes are 
related to CSR] (Directors‟ Report) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part I, 
Sect. 16, §1);  
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part I, §1,2,6) 
 Arrangements for securing the health and safety at 
work of employees and others in connection with 
the activities at work (over 250 employees, 
Directors‟ Report) 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part IV, §10), not activated 
(Gray et al., 1995b) 
Workplace Aggregate emoluments and other benefits of 
chairman, current and past directors (Notes to the 
Accounts)  
Companies Act 1967 (Part I, 
Sect. 6, §1-7); 
 Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 5, 
Part V, §22-34) 
 Particulars for commitments for pensions, whether 
or not provided for (Notes to the Accounts) 
Companies Act 1981 (Sch. 1, 
§54); Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 
4, §50) 
 Average numbers employed by category and wages 
(CA 1967 – Directors‟ Report) and social security 
costs (CA 1985 - Information supplementing P&L 
Account) and by geographic area (DoT/OECD, 
1976 – Notes to the Accounts) 
DoT/OECD Guideline, 1976; 
Companies Act 1967 (Part I, 
Sect. 18, §1-7); 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 4, 
Part III, §56, 94; Sch. 10, §5-8) 
 Numerical analysis of employees with emoluments 
exceeding £10,000 (CA 1967) or £30, 000 (CA 
1985, Notes to the Accounts) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part I, 
Sect. 8, §1-5); 
 Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 5, 
Part VI, §35-37)  
 Reference to policies for full and fair consideration 
to applications for employment by disabled and 
training, career development and promotion of 
disabled employees (over 250 employees, 
Directors‟ Report) 
Statutory Instrument 1980/1160;  
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part III, §9) 
 Action to provide employees with information on 
matters of concern to them as employees (over 250 
employees, Directors‟ Report) 
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part V, §11) 
 Employees‟ or representatives‟ consultation in 
making decisions which affect their interests (over 
250 employees, Directors‟ Report) 
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part V, §11) 
 Encouragement of the involvement of employees in 
the company‟s performance through an employee‟s 
share scheme or other means (over 250 employees, 
Directors‟ report) 
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part V, §11) 
 Employee awareness of financial and economic 
factors affecting the performance of the company 
(over 250 employees, Directors Report)   
Employment Act 1982; 
Companies Act 1985 (Sch. 7, 
Part V, §11) 
 Statement of publicly available report submitted to 
DoT regarding employment practices in South 
Africa before official end of Apartheid (1990, 
Annual Report) 
Code of Conduct 1978 (Cmnd 
7233) 
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Area of Disclosure 
(a) 
Information to be Disclosed 
(b) 
Relevant Legislation 
(c) 
Community References and amounts of donations to charities 
exceeding £50 (CA 1967) or £200 (CA 1985, 
Directors‟ Report) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part I, 
Sect. 19, §1-5);  Companies Act 
1985 (Sch. 7, Part I, §3-5) 
 References and amounts of political donations 
exceeding £50 (CA 1967) or £200 (CA 1985, 
Directors‟ Report ) 
Companies Act 1967 (Part I, 
Sect. 19, §1-5); Companies Act 
1985 (Sch. 7, Part I, §3-5) 
 
NOTE: references to the Code of Conduct 1978, Statutory Instrument 1980 and 
Companies Act 1981 have been drawn from Gray et al (1995b); references to the 
Employment Act 1982 from Day and Woodward (2004). 
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